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RU~NER

~30LD

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

INN,

INC. ,

*

and

M. SMITHSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 15374

*

-vs-

*

::cGLAS C. MERRILL,

*

Defendant, and
:~LLEEN

*

*

B. MERRILL,
Defendant-Respondent.

*

*
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal petitions the Court to affirm the conveyance
:ram Defendant Douglas C. Merrill of his interest in the family home
o~d

real property to Defendant-Respondent Colleen B. Merrill, as con-

~us1ve

against Plaintiff-Appellants Road Runner Inn, Inc., and Harold

·.. Smithson on the grounds that being part of the settlement of the
:1vorce action between the grantor and grantee, the conveyance was for
0

:'air consideration.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 27, 1976, Defendant-Respondent, Colleen B.

'ernll,

(Respondent Colleen Merrill) sued Defendant, Douglas C.

'~rill,

(Defendant Douglas '.'1errill) for divorce in the Third Judi-

01

District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. D 21418.
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~dent Colleen Merrill,

alleged extreme mental cruelty.

On April

12, 1976, the Merrills entered into a Stipulation and Property Se.
tlement.

Defendant Douglas Merrill agreed,

inter alia,

to convey

his interest in the family home and real property to Repondent
Merrill.

cc:. 1

Pursuant to the Stipulation, Defendant Douglas Merrill

executed a quit-claim deed conveying any and all of his interest
the family home and real property to Respondent,
June 21,

1976,

1.

Colleen Merrill.

the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge, entered ths

Interlocutory Decree of Divorce in the action and therein approvec
the property settlement.
On June 30, 1976, Plaintiff-Appellants Road Runner Inn, :,
(Appellant Road Runner)
sued Defendant,

and Harold M. Smithson,

Douglas Merrill and Respondent,

the Third Judicial District Court,
Civil No. 236092,

(Appellant Smithso:.
Colleen Merrill,

Salt Lake County,

i:

State of Utah

for breach of a construction contract.

Appell~'

Road Runner and Smithson alleged damages in the amount of $28, 300.
and, naming Respondent Colleen Merrill as a Defendant, asked that·
conveyance from Defendant to Respondent be set aside.
On October 6, 1976,

Appellants filed a Motion to Intervt

in the divorce action between the Merrills.
Colleen Merrill, yielded to Appellants'

Distressed, Responder.:

demanded Stipulation that'

Judgment and Decree of Divorce not be conclusive against Jl.ppellant 5
to the fairness of the consideration for the conveyance.

The div~

court approved the stipulation and issued the final Judgment and '.c
cree.
On August 15, 1978, in the breach of contract action
Honorable James

s.

t'

Sawaya, Judge, awarded Appellants judgment ac~
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:efendant, Douglas Merrill,

in the amount of $28,300.00.

The learned

·ur1st concluded, however, that the conveyance from Defendant, Douglas
·•errill, of his interest in the family home to Respondent, Colleen
·.:errill,

"being part of the settlement of the divorce action between

;ran tor and grantee, was for a fair consideration."
clusion of Law, No. 5)

Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was granted a

iudgment of no cause of action and was dismissed.
of Law,

(Amended Con-

(Amended Conclusion

No. 7)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Colleen Merrill, pleads the Court to affirm the

conclusion of the trial court that the conveyance from Defendant,
Douglas Merrill, of his interest in the family home and real property,
'oeing part of the settlement of the divorce action between the granter
wd grantee, was for a fair consideration.
STATEMENT OF F.11.CTS
In 1965, Defendant, Douglas Merrill, and Respondent, Colleen
~rrill,

~ane,

then his wife, received a vacant lot located at 2341 Neffs

Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift from C.L. Merrill, Defendant's

father.

Defendant and Respondent both possessed substantial construction

skills, learned in their youths from working alongside their fathers.
:s newlyweds,
~ars

the Merrills had refined their skills through six (6)

of building churches throughout the United States.

1ad taught women in Relief Society how to
'·d insulate buildings.
--~P1r

Respondent

lay floors, hang ceiling tile

The Merrills, accordingly, decided to build

own home together upon the property they had

been

given.
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For two(2) years, Respondent Colleen Merrill, labored in de-

J

signing and constructing for her growing family their first home.
Her efforts never flagged.
Merrill, was hospitalized,

During six (6) months when Defendant, '.•:
Respondent hung sheet rock,

laid floor:

tiled the roof, painted the interior and exterior, completed the!:
work and landscaped the 55'

x 165'

ily; Defendant could not provide.
their three(3)

lot.

The church supported

t~

\

On March 11, 1967, the Merrills,

children were able to move into the home.

Al though talented as a builder,

Defendant Douglas Merrii.

lacked the financial acumen to manage the tamily' s resources.
ials used in constructing the home were obtained on credit;

Mato:

unbek~c~

to Respondent, Colleen Merrill,

creditors were not paid.

Several ;)

the accounts went to judgment.

It became necessary to borrow aga1:.

the equity in the home.
In 1968, .l\merican Savings loaned $13,000.00
twenty(20) year first deed of trust.

against a

$4,300.00 was used to

debt for plumbing supplies owed to Respondent's father;

reti~

$1,000.00

went to the friend in whose name the $13, 000. 00 loan had been obtair..:
because Defendant, Douglas Merrill, had such a poor credit rating:
judgment liens were cleared; hospital bills were paid; the balance
purchased a 1967 Thunder Bird and new furniture.

New judgments ar:• 1

In 1973, Murray First Thrift loaned $15,000.00 against a!
six ( 6) year second deed of trust.

Judgments were paid with part :: i

the money; the balance purchased a 1973 Thunderbird and an 18 foot
Starfire boat.

Defendant Douglas Merrill defaulted on the loan.

On February 10, 1976, Clarence J. Bowden,
loaned $3,310.00 against a third deed of trust.

Responden t · s --· I

The money was uc: '
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l

reinstate the Murray First Thrift second deed of trust following notice
Jf foreclosure.

New judgments remained unpaid.

In 1968, the year after Respondent had completed the constuc:ion of the family home, Respondent began working in order to help
support the family.

Her wages from Warshaw's, Skagg's, and ZCMI were

' small, in 1972, she obtained her real estate license.

She worked for

.'iR~S

as a commissioned, self employed saleswoman until January 1975,

~en

family and marital problems clamored for her attention.

Without

'espondent's income, the Merrill family struggled to survive.

The

church provided support; the Merrills purchased food with food stamps.
Beleagured by Defendant, Douglas Merrill's improvident impecienities,
Respondent Colleen Merrill, returned again to work in 1976.
On tebruary 27, 1976, Respondent filed for divorce from
Jefendant Douglas Merrill on the grounds of mental cruelty.
12, 1976,
~ent.

On April

the Merrills entered into a Stipulation and Property Settle-

Defendant Douglas Merrill agreed, inter alia, to convey his

interest in the family home to Respondent, Colleen Merrill.
The home appraised for $38,000.00.

First, second and third

deeds of trust encumbered the home in the total amount of $26,348.00.
Outstanding judgments amounted to $1,540.00.
therefore, amounted to $10,112.00.

The unencumbered equity,

Respondent, as a joint tenant had

an interest valued at $5,056.00; Defendant's interest was also valued
at $5,056.00.

Defendant, Douglas Merrill, was entitled to claim out

Jf his undivided one-half (12)

joint tenancy interest, a homestead ex-

'mption amounting to $6,700.00 ($4,500.00 head of family; $1,500.00
0

s spouse; $1, 2 00. 00 two other members of family) .

The $6, 700. 00
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homestead exemption exceeded the $ 5, 056. 00 equity to which Defer,~ 2 •.
was entitled.

Thus the quit-claim deed which Defendant executed

suant to the Stipulation and Property Settlement conveyed an

~

inte~

in property to Respondent which was beyond the reach of creditors .
of record.

Respondent, however, was not aware that Defendant had:.:

paid the materialmen and sub-contractors on the Road Runner const:·.;
project begun March 17, 1975.

As grantee,

Respondent believed

s~,

fairly settling divorce matters with Defendant.
The trial court wisely concluded that the conveyance

~:J

claim deed from Defendant Douglas Merrill of his interest in the

td

home and real property to Respondent Colleen Merrill being part of I

settlement of the divorce action between the granter and grantee.··:
for a fair consideration.

The decision of the trial court should:-

affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE CONVEYANCE FROM DEFENDANT, DOUGLAS MERRILL, OF HIS INTEREi'
IN THE FAMILY HOME AND REAL PROPERTY TO RESPONDENT, COLLEEN MERRIL'.
BEING PART OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN THE GR:c::
AND GRANTEE, WAS FOR A FAIR CONSIDERATION.
The award of the home to Respondent,

Colleen Merrill, so·

she would have the benefit and use thereof in providing for the ch:.
was fair,

reasonable, and equitable,

and well within the comparat:·'

wide latitude of discretion that the Utah Supreme Court has always
recognized the trial court should have in such matters.
Ciraulo,

576 P2d 884

(Utah 1978).

In Ciraulo, the divorced wife :e

ceived $9,000.00 equity in a home valued at $30,000.00.
findings recited,

Cirau~

The tna:

" •.. there were periods of time during their :nc:·
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~en

the defendant failed to make any payments to support ... the

(wife) and the minor children"

Accordingly, the trial court found

1 t:

reasonable and proper that the court award to the
(wife) in lieu of any such claim the eguity that
the parties have in said real property and that
therefore the real property should be awarded to
the (wife) free and clear of any claim of the
defendant, and subject only to the outstanding
indebtedness thereon".
(Utah Supreme Court's
emphasis)

In the case at bar, not only did Respondent, Colleen Merrill, have a
complaint against Defendant, Douglas Merrill, for his failure during
their marriage to support her and their minor children.

She could

also claim to have benefi tted Defendant by the thousands of dollars
worth of labor she expended in building the house.
The Court historically has recognized the value of a wife's
~penditures

on her husband's behalf.

In Lund v. Howell, 67 P2d 215

(Utah 19 3 7) , the Court refused to set aside an assignment of an un~~ded

interest in an estate as a fraud upon creditors of the husband.

There, the wife had spent $4,000.00 of her own money in building a
house in Salt Lake City.

The home was thereafter mortgaged and sub-

stantial amounts of the proceeds were advanced to pay the husband's
lebts in Idaho.
iay his bills.

The wife did not know that her husband was unable to
In 1928, creditors obtained judgments against the

1usband amounting to $4,881.00.
state.

0

He assigned his interest to his wife.

~e assignment,
!~the
i]d

In 1930, he became an heir to an
The creditors attacked

challenging the wife's good faith and the sufficiency

consideration she had given for the assignment.

The Court up-
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the assignment, relying upon definite documentary evidence that

the funds received from the mortgage of the house in which she r.a~
invested her own money had gone directly for payment of the husbar:
debts.
Here,

the labor Respondent,

came the equity against which Defendant,
provide for the family.

invested~-

Colleen Merrill,

Douglas Merrill,

borrowed·

Defendant's conveyance to Respondent

returned to her a part of the value she had created.

me~:

The conveyar.:,

scarcely discharged Defendant's ill-performed duty to support Resper.:,
and their minor children.

It was clearly within the divorce court•

prerogative to make whatever disposition of property i t deemed fa1:

equitable and necessary for the protection and welfare of the part;•'
English v. English.
148

565 P2d 409

(Utah 1977); Pearson v.

v. Baker,

551 P2d 1263

(Utah 1977); Naylor v.

Pearson,

561 P2d 1080

Naylor, 563;

(Utah 1977): Bak::

(Utah 1976).

A.
WHILE THE CONVEYANCE BETWEEN DIVORCING SPOUSES MIGHT;
SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY, NONETHELESS, THE TRANSACTION IS NOT ~E:
ESSARILY INVALID, AND THE TRUE FACTS ARE SUBJECT TO PROOF.
Appellants object to the trial court's conclusion that::•
conveyance,

"being part of the settlement of the divorce action bet•

the granter and grantee, was for a fair consideration."
correctly state

the proposition that any conveyance between re lat:

is subject to rigid scrutiny.
relatives.

Appellant!

Divorcing spouses connot be denom1n:·

Appellants admit on page fourteen(l4)

of Appellants'?:

that;
no case has been found which specifically holds a
conveyance to be fraudulent under facts identical
to those in the case at bar.
Appellants attempt, however,

to weave an argument from the shreG'
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-: farnilially dissimilar fact patterns to save their case.

Their

o'.:t2rnpt must fail.
The case at bar concerns neither a conveyance between
:r0thers, Smith v. Popham,

513 P2d 1172

(Oregon 1973), nor a con-

·.·eyance between parent and child, Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 U2d
.-3, 369 P2d 962

(1962); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 U2d 287,

J960); Peterson v. Peterson,

· ~ndant,

351 P2d 959

112 Utah 554, 190 P2d 135

(1948).

De-

Douglas Merrill, conveyed his interest in the family home to

~spondent,

Colleen Merrill, pursuant to a court-approved property

settlement in the divorce action she brought against him; the familial
, relationship was over.
The case at bar concerns neither a conveyance for which the
:onsideration was support of the grantor, Brain v. Gould, 46 Ill. 293
1867), nor a voluntary conveyance by which the grantor secured to

'tmself a continuing financial benefit by relieving
:urden of supporting his wife in the future,

himself of the

Detroit Security Trust

:" v. Gitre, 254 Mich. 66, 235 NW 884 (1931); Augurgh v. Lydston, 117

L1
·• . App. 574 (1905 l .

Respondent will not support Defendant; Defendant

I

\Qll not be relieved of his duty to support his minor children and

L.

:;eir mother.

j

j_ade

The case at bar does not concern a conveyance from a husband
in consideration of the wife's forbearance in pursuing a meritorious

::vorce action,

National Surety Co. v. Wittich, 184 Minn. 44,

(1931); First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Enzler,

·in

-oska 1975): Oppenheimer v.
~~.

237 NW

537 P2d 517

Collins, 115 Wis. 283, 91 NW 690 (1902).

Respondent, Colleen Merrill, refused
when Appellants
intervened
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be deterred in her suit for
divorce from Defendant,

Douglas Merrill.

The case at bar does resemble Lieberman v. Kelso,
137 (Fla App 1978).

In that case, the husband conveyed his

354

;~

ent 1 ~

interest in the family home to the wife pursuant to a judgment of
dissolution of marriage.

The wife was "not aware of the existence
di~

of appellant's judgment against the husband at the time of the
The court upheld the conveyance noting,

in passing,

that the arm's~~

length nature of the transaction was further buttressed by the

int~

that the settlement agreement required the wife to convey her
in certain other property to the husband.
because the court believed,

Lieberman is significan:

in essence;

that the transfer of the husband's (entireties)
interest to the wife pursuant to the judgment
of dissolution was equivalent to the defeasance
of the husband's interest in the property which
would have occurred had he predeceased his wife
while the parties were still married.

In other words, _11.ppel lants had never levied execution upon their ; .. ·
ment, hence the judgment had never attached to the husband's
one-half(~)

entireties interest in the home.

undiv::O

When the husband con•:' 1

his entireties interest, the wife received the home free of the j~
ment lien.

(Emphasis added)
In the case at bar,

Respondent,

Colleen Merrill, was

n~

aware that Defendant, Douglas Merrill, had not paid the materialmer
and sub-contractors on the Road Runner Inn,
judgment existed at the time of the divorce

construction project::.
conveyance.

had no interest in any other property to convey,
fendant.

Responde:

in exchange, to ~i

Nevertheless, al though the Stipulation and Property Set:-'

ment required Defendant to assume and pay all debts and obligatio:.
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curred by the parties during the marriage,

Respondent

sold prope:-

she received in the settlement and used her own income as well to pay
Jff as many of those debts as she possibly could.
~rrill,

Defendant, Douglas

even then, could not fulfill his stipulated and decreed ob-

ligations.

Clearly, the facts

of the case at bar justify application

of the Lieberman rule that the conveyance of an undivided joint pro~rty

interest from one divorcing spouse to the other, pursuant to a

court approved property settlement, vests the property in the grantee
free of any unexecuted judgment lien.
It cannot be said that the tremendous labor Respondent, Colleen
:.1errill, expended in constructing the home for her family amounted to
a lack of consideration for the conveyance.

It cannot be said that

the eight years Respondent worked to help support the family amounted
to'a lack of consideration for the conveyance.

It certainly cannot

be said that an equity valued at even less than the minimum homestead
exemption was a disproportionately large amount to settle upon a
divorcing wife with custody of two minor children after twenty years
of marriage.

The evidence in the trial court was clear and satis-

factory that Respondent, Colleen Merrill, accepted the conveyance of
Defendant's interest in the family home in good faith and not to hinder
or defraud Defendant's creditors.

Respondent entreats the Court to

assure her that she and her children will no longer have to pay for
~fendant's

failure to pay his debts.

Appellants Road Runner and Smithson, like Colleen Merrill
c1scovered too late that that Defendant, Douglas Merrill, lacked the
3~1lity

to perform his contractual obligations.

Appellants could have

;rotected themselves
requiring
a digitization
construction
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Colleen Merrill, could do little more than free herself from the
bonds of a costly relationship.

To force Respondent and her two

children out of the home she built for them would be to exact

t~

final pound of flesh from a woman who has paid dearly already fN
vows.

The Court must affirm the conveyance from Defendant of his

interest in the family home and real property to Respondent, Colle;
Merrill as conclusive against Appellants Road Runner and Smithson.
the grounds that, being part of the settlement of the divorce

act~

between the granter and grantee, the conveyance was for a fair m.:
sideration.
B.
PRIOR TO THE CONVEYANCE FROM DEFEN':JANT, RESPONDENT
POSSESSED AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE FAMILY HOME BY
VIRTUE OF HER STATUS AS JOINT TENANT.
An estate in joint tenancy is one held by two or more per1

sons jointly, with equal rights to share in its enjoyment during

t·l

lives and having as its distinguishing feature the right of surv1n
ship, or j us accrescendi, by virtue of which the entire estate, Uf:·
goes to the survivor free and exempt :i
I
11 charges made by his deceased cotenant.
20 Am.Jur. 2d, CotenaEJ
the death of a joint tenant,

and Ownership, Sec. 3, p. 94.
of the relationship,
to the

latter'~

One joint tenant has not, by reasor

I

any authority to bind his cotenant with respe:r

presumedly equal

interest in the common property.

Stark v. Loker et. al., 129 P2d 390

(Ca. 1942).

I

Execution may ~1

upon the interest of one of the joint tenants while all joint tenc::!
are alive, and upon purchase of the interest of one of the joint
tenants at execution sale the joint tenancy is severed, and
and other joint -tenants "become tenants in common."

purchc;~

Zeigler v.
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!

_j

~nnell,

126 P2d 118 (Ca. 1942); Pepin v. Stricklen, 114 Cal. A.pp.

32, 299.

P. 557 (1931).

The mere docketing of a judgment against a

ioint tenant does not effect a severance of the interest of such
tenant.

Musa v. Segelke

&

K. Co., 272 NW 657 (Wis. 1937).

A ten-

ancy by entireties resembles a joint tenancy; a tenancy by entireties
~n

only be created between husband and wife, however.
The Lieberman case, supra, concerned the conveyance from a

husband to his divorcing wife of his undivided one-half entireties
interest in the family home pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of
marriage.

There, the divorcing wife received the property free and

exempt from an unexecuted judgment lien that she did not know existed
against the husband.

The court believed that the conveyance;

as equivalent to the defeasance of the husband's
interest in the property which would have occurred
had he predeceased his wife while the parties were
still married.
The case at bar concerns a joint tencany, rather than a
tenancy by entireties as in Lieberman.
similar.

The facts are strikingly

Defendant, Douglas Merrill, conveyed his undivided one-half

Joint tenancy interest in the family home to his divorcing wife, Respondent, Colleen Merrill, pursuant to a court approved divorce property settlement.
of Appellants'

Respondent was not event aware of the possibility

judgment against Defendant husband.

Respondent there-

fore urges the Court to adopt the reasoning of the Florida Court and
to declare that Respondent received the home free of any potential
Judgment lien that might have arisen because of Defendant's in~bility
·s perform his contractual obligations.
C.
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CONVEYANCE TO RESPONDENT OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY INTEREST

EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION CANNOT BE ATTACHED BY CREDITORS.
On April 12, 1976, Defendant, Douglas Merrill, was entit
to claim out of his undivided one-half joint tenancy interest in
family home a homestead exemption in the amount of $6, 700.00

($4,.

head of family; $1,500.00 spouse; plus $1,200.00 two other memeber:
the family).
Annotated,

Utah Homestead Act, Section 28-1-1 et.

Utah co:

~'

(1953).
The homestead exemption provided for .... is
not strictly an estate or property passing to
those who are under the law entitled to enjoy
it, but rather a protection to them in its
enjoyment against the demands of creditors.
If the estate is solvent and there are no
creditors, no protection is needed .... Knudsen
v. Hannberg, 8 U 203, 30 P 749 (1892).

Failure to make a homestead declaration does not impair t,
1

homestead right, so long as evidence shows that spouses were

reside~

of the state when the conveyance was executed and continued to res::J
therein, that husband owned no other land and that the family did :
did not include children.
1935).

Williams vs. Peterson, 46 P2d 674

In that case, the husband executed a Promissory Note

(Ut~

and~1

gage in her favor to compensate her for her share of money held
joint account that he was investing in business.

Creditors

set aside the mortgage alleging a fraudulent conveyance.

1

ir

!

sued~

The tr::.

court failed or refused to make any findings with reference to
whether or not the mortgaged property was exempt from execution
the homestead law.

The Court stated that:

if the property was exempt it is wholly immaterial
so far as the (creditor) is concerned whether or
not there was any consideration for the mortgage,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ur.::I

upon the failure of the husband, he being the
judgment debtor, to claim and select a homestead, it is the privileg~ of the wife to do
so.
~cordingly,

the Court upheld the wife's claim of homestead in her

husband's undivided one-half interest in their jointly owned farm.
Similarly in Smith v. Popham, supra, the grantee of land
hh1ch was the gr an tor's homestead, who never claimed, was entitled
to raise the homestead exemption as a defense to a suit to set aside
conveyances on the ground that they were made to defraud creditors.

In

that case, as in Leiberman, supra, the Oregon Court ruled that the
grantee of the homestead took the property free of the creditor's
Judgment, unless the grantor had lost his homestead exemption such as
by abandonment.
An owner of homestead property exempt from execution may con~y

it to anyone, including his wife, without having to conveyance

overthrown

as defrauding his creditors, provided he makes the proper

defense when such transaction is assailed.
99 (Utah 1944).

Cardon v. Harper, 151 P2d

In Stearns vs. Stearns, 126 NW 2d 124 (S. Dak. 1964),

an assignment to the divorced wife of possession of the homestead was
proper in order to provide a home for the minor children. That one has
conveyed property in fraud of creditors does not prevent him from
:laiming it as a homestead; such right being for the benefit of the
'.amily, cannot be frittered away even by the head of the family.
~son

Exchange Savings Bank v. Tietjen, 225 P 598 (Utah 1924).

"~estead

The

claim provided for in Article XXII Section 1 of the Utah

.0nsti tution may be made at any time before sale or execution.
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Utah

2l!i_lders' supply co. v. Gardner, 42 P2d 989 (Utah 1935); Kimball v.

Salisbury,
p 315

17 U 381,

53 P 1037

(1898); Folsom v.

Asper,

25 u 299, -.

(1903).

In the case at bar,

Defendant, Douglas Merrill, was a res:

dent of the State of Utah at the time of the quit-claim deed to
spondent, Colleen Merrill,

~-

Defendant owned no other lands in which

to claim the homestead exemption; the family included two minor cri 1:,
ren.

The trial Court made no express finding with respect

tot~~

stead exemption to which Defendant was constitutionally entitled.
Nevertheless, such finding is implicit in the trial court's conclus.I
that the said transfer by quit-claim deed of the home and real pro1

perty from Defendant, Douglas Merrill, to Respondent, Colleen Merr::
was not a fraudulent conveyance.

(Amended Conclusion of Law No.

6:

Evidence revealed that the house appraised for $38, 000. 00 at the U
of the conveyance.

First,

second, and third deeds of trust encumbe:j

the property in the amount of $25,348.00.
$1,540.00.

Existing liens totaled

The unencumbered equity held in joint tenancy,

amounted to $10,112.00.

thereto~:

Respondent by virtue of her undivided one-I

half interest claimed an equity valued at $5,056.00; Defendant sim·

i
I

larly claimed an equity valued at $5,056.00.

The homestead exempt::1

of $6, 700. 00 to which Defendant was entitled exceeded the value of ·1
equity he conveyed.

The interest

Defendant, Douglas Merrill, trar.=

·
1

ferred to Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was exempt from execution.
Clearly,

'.

the Court must affirm the conveyance from Defendant, Doug) :

Merrill, of his interest in the family home and real property to ?' · .
spondent, Colleen Merrill, as conclusive against Appellants Road:.
ner and Smithson.
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POINT II
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT CONVEYANCE WAS MADE
INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD APPELLANTS.

,;I'fH

Where the Supreme Court finds that the prepoderance df the
evidence supports -t:he trial court findings, or has doubt as to where
:~preponderance

lies, or finds that the evidence may slightly pre-

ponderate against the trial court's conclusion, but such preponderance
ray be offset by the trial court's better position to judge the credi-

oility of the witness, the Supreme Court will not reverse.

Boccalero

v. Bee, et. al., 126 P2d 1063 (Utah 1942); Stanley v. Stanley, 97 U 250,
?4 P2d 65

(Utah 1939).

The Supreme Court makes considerable allowance

fur the advantageous position of the trial court in close proximity to
the parties and witnesses, which provided a better basis for insight
into the truthfulness of the testimony offered than is afforded by
:eview of the record.
Appellants
~s

Givan v. Lambeth, supra.
alleged in the trial court that the conveyance

not made for a fair consideration and that the conveyance was made

·nth intent to hinder, delay and defraud them in the collection of
their claim against Defendant, Douglas Merrill.
and fair opportunity to present their case.
~i~

Appellants had a full

The honored and learned

judge was not persuaded; the evidence failed to preponderate in

'.avor of Appellants' allegations.

Appellants maintain that the trial

:ourt erred in its determination; the facts on appeal do not support
:~eir contention that the conveyance by Defendant,

Douglas Merrill, of

•s interest in the family home to Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was
'ie with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Appellant Road Run-

·er.
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transfer was not a fraudulent conveyance".
No.

(Amended Conclusion of

6.)

A.
EVIDENCE DISCLOSES NO FRAUD OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY
FRAUD ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT.

An intent to delay or defraud a creditor is not to be imp'.

from the execution of the deed; the cooperative fraud of the granter
and grantee together must be shown.

Billings v. Parsons,

53, p 73C

(Utah 1898).
In that case, debtor husband paid appellant a small sumfc
wages due and on the same day gave the wife $100 worth of goods.

Tr.

following day, the husband executed a deed of assignment for the bei,
fit of creditors of the inventory of his store.

Appellant as credi::

attacked the transfer of the $100.00 worth of goods to the wife as:
concealment of assets.

The source of the goods was not shown.

wife was in no way implicated in the husband's fraud.

The

The Court ru'.i

that a fraudulent intent on the part of the granter alone was not 5'::
ficient to avoid the transfer when no preference was made and where
the grantee did not participate in the fraud.
Barker, 40 P 769

In Ogden State Bank..l;

(Utah 1895) , the Court noted that if such preferenc:

were made with a fraudulent design, or with intent to hinder and del:
the appellant in his collection of the judgment, still, if the grar.::
did not participate in the fraud or have any knowledge of it, the v:·
lidity of the conveyance would not be affected.
The Court considered the innocence of the grantee in a re:!
recent case.

In Boccalero v. Bee, supra,

the Court decided in 194:

a judgment debtor assigned his one-seventh interest in his father'
estate to his sister.

Cancelled checks dating back ten years
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; 1 shed

that debtor owed his sister $3,600.00.

The sister had no know-

iedge of her brother's financial difficulties at the time of the conThe Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the

,;eyance.

oonveyance was made in good faith, for sufficient consideration and
rlthout intent to defraud.
In the case at bar, the record discloses no fraud or partici1ation in any fraud on

the part of Respondent, Colleen Merrill.

At

\the time of the conveyance, Respondent was not aware that Defendant,

\ ;ouglas Merrill, had not paid materialmen

I

:jload Runner Inn,

Inc.

and sub-contractors on the

construction project.

The value of the interest

\ :onveyed to Respondent for the use and benefit of the minor children
ias less than the homestead exemption to which Defendant was then en:1tled.

Defendant merely conveyed to Respondent value she had created

~clearly.

Respondent sustained her burden as grantee to show the good

:: '.aith of the transaction.

1

The evidence is clear and satisfactory that

~

conveyance was made in good faith,

~

without .intent to defraud.

for a sufficient consideration,

WHETHER A CONVEYANCE IS MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT
DELAY OR DEFRAUD A CREDITOR IS DETERMINED BY
3E FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE.
8

:,:TUAL INTENT TO HINDER,

Another factor to consider in showing the grantee's good faith

:j-; whether

with the consent of the grantee, the granter treated the pro-

1my as his own.
·~instant

Paxton v. Paxton, 80 U 540, 15 P2d 1051 (1932).

case, Respondent, Colleen Merrill, had to obtain a restraining

:ier to prevent Defendant, Douglas Merrill,

l 0s.

In

from coming on to the prem-

Clearly, Defendant did not have Respondent's consent to treat

\:"property as his own, nor can it be said that Respondent held the
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of fraud.

Respondent's good faith cannot be denied.

The evidence

is insufficient to show actual intent to defraud.

Where the conveyance of real property antedates the judgrr,

upon which a creditor seeks to levy, evidence is insufficient to sh:
actual intent to defraud.
1970).

Hillstead v. Leavitt,

475 P2d 1017

(~~

There, the initial funds used to purchase real property

come from the sale of a violin owned by the wife.

h~

The husband and·.

parlayed the initial investment into more valuable holdings through
a series of transactions.

Title was kept in the wife's name.

In a

later exchange of the Wyoming property for Utah property, the husba:
returned the interest that had been in his name to the wife.

Credi:

obtained a judgment and alleged that the conveyance to the wife of·
interest temporarily held in the husband's name was made with actu;
intent to hinder, delay and defraud.

The Court found the evidence:

sufficient.
In this case, the value created in the house through the.
ti~

of Respondent, Colleen Merrill, diminished.

First, second, and

deeds of trust severely reduced the equity.

Defendant held an inW

of $5056. 00; this amount was even less than the $6, 700. 00 homesteac
exemption to which he was entitle.

Defendant's involuntary return:

Respondent of that depleted interest fourteen months before Appella:
obtained judgment cannot be said to have been made with actual inte:
to hinder, delay, or defraud.
Where creditors have had an opportunity to protect theffi 51 ·
in the event of debtor's default, the Court has considered this a:
mary fact.

Givan v. Lambeth, supra.

There, creditors sold a hea•::
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3 uto

dealership to debtor.

Experienced businessmen, creditors retained

lien on the corporate stock in the event of default on promissory

3

notes executed by debtor.

Prior to the purchase of the dealership,

debtor had executed a deed conveying his sheep ranch to his sons who
h~

long operated it for him.

Several months after the purchase of

the dealership, debtor delivered and the sons recorded the deed.
dealership failed.

When debtor defaulted, as creditors anticipated,

they alleged that the conveyance of the ranch was fraudulent.
:ourt, however,

The

found no badges of fraud.

The

The evidence was sufficient

to sustain a finding that the conveyance was not fraudulent.
Here, Appellants are
~ad

experienced in business.

Appellant

Runner had first-hand knowledge of Defendant's financial problems;

ooe of its officers was Defendant's friend who had obtained financing
in

his own name from American Savings, for Defendant, because Defendant

.1ad such a poor credit rating.

Appellants had every opportunity to

~otect

themselves in the event of Defendant's default.

~olleen

Merrill, did not even know that Defendant had not paid the

~aterialmen

ject.

Respondent

and sub-contractors on the Road Runner construction pro-

It cannot be said that Respondent participated in any fraud

rn anticipation of which Appellent Road Runner could not have pro~cted

itself.

Clearly, the evidence is insufficient to show actual

:r.tent to hinder, delay or defraud Appellants.
The Statute of Elizabeth,

from which the Utah Fraudulent

jnveyances Act is derived, was never intended to prevent a debtor from
:;;·ing or. securing his honest debts, or from doing equity and exact
;st ice.
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:aa an honest obligation to Respondent Colleen Merrill and the two

children remaining at home to ?rovide support.

In cannot be said

Defendant's conveyance even partook of the nature of a voluntary
fer and is therefore subject to attack.

t

t:;

Notwithstanding, Appellar.t'

have provided no reason to doubt that the truthfulness of the_test
was so tinctured with perjury as to justify the rejection of it
Smith v. Edward,

17 P2d 264

is:~

(Utah 1932).

The evidence is entirely insufficient to show that the c::
veyance from Defendant Douglas Merrill,

to Respondent Colleen Merr::

was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud.

The Court

should affirm the conveyance from Defendant of his interest in the
family home and real property to Respondent, being part of the sett:
ment of the divorce action between the gr an tor and grantee, as cor.cl usi ve against Appellants.
CONCLUSION
On February 27, 1976, Respondent,
fendant,

Douglas Merrill,

Colleen Merrill, sued:'

for divorce and custody of two minor chi::

Pursuant to a Stipulation and Property Settlement approved by the ::
vorce court, Defendant quit- claimed his interest in the family ho:'
Respondent.

At the time of the conveyance, Respondent was not awe:

that Defendant had not paid the materialmen and subcontractors on'
construction project for Appellant Road Runner Inn,

Inc.

Respondent, Colleen Merrill, had labored two ( 2) years tc
build the home at 2341 Neff Lane for her family.
encumbered by first,

The home was he:

second, and third deeds of trust and liens.

joint tenants, Respondent and Defendant each could claim an equi':·
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·~lued

at $5056.00.

The homestead exemption of $6,700.00 to which

Jefendant was entitled exceeded the value of the equity conveyed to
?espondent

Utah Code Annotated, Section 28-1-1 et.

~-

(1953).

On June 30, 1976, Appellants sued Defendant, Douglas Merrill, for breach of the construction contract.

On August 15, 1978,

the matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge .
.:i.ppellants were awarded a judgment against Defendant in amount of
328,300.00.

The learned and experienced jurist concluded that:

1)

The transfer by quit-claim deed of the home and real
property located at 2341 Neff Lane, Salt Lake City,
Utah, to the Defendant, Colleen B. Merrill, from the
Defendant, Douglas C. Merrill, on the 12th day of
April, 1976, being part of the settlement of the divorce action between the granter and grantee, was for
a fair consideration. (Amended Conclusion of Law
No. 5); and

2)

The said transfer by quit-claim deed of the home and
real property from Defendant, Douglas C. Merrill, to
Defendant, Colleen B. Merrill, was not a fraudulent
conveyance. (Amended Conclusion of Law No. 6).

In this appeal, Respondent, Colleen B. Merrill, pleads that
the Court affirm the conclusions of the trial court and declare the
conveyance from Defendant of his interest in the family home and real
property to Respondent as conclusive against Appellants.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of July, 1979.

JJ!~
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent,
Colleen B. Merrill
660 South 2nd East
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
534-1035
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Respondent's Brief by hand delivenr.:
two copies to the following:
Roger S. Blaylock, Esq.
MORRIS & BLAYLOCK
Attorneys for Defendant, Douglas C. Merrill
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
W. Waldan Lloyd
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this 30th day of July, 1979.
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